A bicyclist injured
in 2014 when she was struck by an on-duty Chesterton Police officer while
she was crossing Lute Road in Portage may sue the Town of Chesterton as well
as the Porter County Drug Task Force (DTF), to which the officer had been
assigned at the time of the accident.
So ruled the
Indiana Court of Appeals on Monday.
The ruling
overturns a summary judgment against the bicyclist issued by Porter Superior
Court Judge Roger Bradford, who found that the “presumption of negligence”
on the bicyclist’s part barred her from seeking damages against the town and
DTF.
The accident
occurred on July 9, 2014, as bicyclist Sheila Gonzalez was attempting to
cross Lute Road while traveling the Prairie Duneland Trail. According to
court documents, Gonzalez had stopped for a line of vehicles, then proceeded
across when she thought it was clear, only to be struck by Office Sara
Ritz’s eastbound vehicle.
On Sept. 25, 2017,
Bradford granted motions for summary judgment filed by the town and DTF, on
the ground that in Indiana “even a slight degree of negligence on the part
of (the bicyclist), if proximately contributing to her claimed damages, will
operate as a complete bar to the Gonzalazes’ action for damages.”
Both the town and
the DTF argued that in two ways Gonzalez was presumptively negligent: that
Indiana Code requires bicyclists to stop for all posted stop signs--like the
one on the Prairie Duneland Trail at the intersection of Lute Road; and that
a bicyclist may not, just as a motorist may not, start moving after stopping
until movement can be made with reasonable safety.
The Court of
Appeals, however, suggested that the town and DTF’s reasoning in this matter
is circular: that “one must essentially be found negligent to trigger the
presumption of negligence, rendering the presumption inapplicable and
superfluous.” For that reason, the Court of Appeals ruled, “we reject (the
town and DTF’s) assertion that presumption of negligence stemming from the
violation of a safety statute has any part to play in this case.”
On the contrary,
the Court of Appeals accepted Gonzalez’s argument that the case should go to
court for a trying of the evidence. “While the Gonzalezes implicitly concede
that there is designated evidence from which a jury could find that (she)
was contributorily negligent, they argue that the designated evidence would
also permit a finding that she was not. Viewing the designated evidence in a
light most favorable to the Gonzalezes, we conclude that they are correct.”
Among other things,
the Court of Appeals took note of Gonzalez’s testimony “that it was her
practice while riding a bicycle always to stop at all intersections and look
both ways before crossing”; and the testimony of her two children, biking
with her, that “Ritz’s vehicle was traveling faster than the other traffic
on the road.”
“A factfinder could
possibly conclude from the above that (Gonzalez) complied with the standard
of ordinary care but nevertheless failed to see the approaching Ritz, and/or
incorrectly concluded that the fast-moving vehicle was too far away to pose
a threat,” the Court of Appeals stated.
The town and the
DTF, for their parts, argued that Gonzalez’s testimony concerning her
bicycling habits “was immaterial and very likely inadmissible to boot”; that
her children’s testimony that their mother “did nothing wrong” is similarly
inadmissible “as opinion testimony”; and that in any case “it is undisputed
that Lute Road was not ‘clear’ when (Gonzalez) entered it,” that the fact
that she did stop at Lute Road “is not evidence that she kept a proper
lookout for hazards, and that “the undisputed fact that (her) view was
unobstructed allows only the inference that she saw Ritz’s vehicle
approaching.”
These arguments the
Court of Appeals rejected: “Whatever value these arguments might have if
made to a jury, our job is only to evaluate the designated evidence to the
extent necessary for deciding whether it generates a genuine issue of
material fact, precluding summary judgment. We have concluded it does.”